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REAL PROPERTY-GENERAL SCHEME IN ENFoRCEMEN'I' OF R.EsTRicnvE 
CoVENANTs-Common grantor filed for record a plat of the subdivision in which 
defendant and plaintiff both own lots. Plaintiff alleged that the subdivision 
was restricted. Only three of fifteen subdivision deeds entered for record con-
tained written restrictions, and the subdivision plat which had been filed did 
not show any restrictions. In an action brought by plaintiff to prevent the 
defendant from violating the alleged restrictions, held, temporary injunction 
restraining the defendant granted. The court found a general building scheme 
of which the defendant had actual notice when he purchased his lot. Womack 
v. Dean, (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) 266 S. W. (2d) 540. 
Various criteria have been suggested by the courts for determining the exist-
ence of a common building scheme. Although some courts demand universal 
written restrictions in the deeds to the lots of the subdivision, 1 more require that 
only a substantial number of the deeds contain written restrictions.2 Identical 
restrictions are not usually required, but the amount of variation allowed will 
depend upon the individual court. 3 Other tests of a general building scheme 
are the actual conditions in the subdivision,4 the acceptance of the actual con-
ditions and reliance thereon by the owners,5 the filing of a plat of the sub-
division showing the restrictions,6 and oral agreements among the owners.7 
Another approach would not require any one of these, but would determine the 
existence of a general scheme by considering all of these factors together.8 In 
the principal case, the court relied heavily on the actual conditions and on a 
general understanding among the owners in finding the existence of a general 
building scheme. Apparently this court adopted a lenient standard for determin-
ing the existence of a general scheme. In granting a temporary injunction, the 
court did not have to consider the merits of the case. However, it seems possible 
to infer a disposition on the part of the court that these restrictions should be 
permanently enforced. To enforce restrictions in a subdivision among the 
owners inter se, the courts have developed the doctrine of reciprocal negative 
easements.9 This doctrine requires a common grantor who places restrictive 
1 Hooper v. Lottman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 171 S.W. 270; Abbott v. Steigman, 263 
Mass. 585, 161 N.E. 596 (1928). 
2 See 3 TIFFANY, RnAr. PROPERTY, 3d ed., §868, p. 505 (1939) and cases cited therein. 
As to what percentage of deeds must contain written restrictions, see Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 
Utah 54, 169 P. (2d) 781 (1946). 
3 See BURBY, RnAr. PROPERTY 136 (1943). 
4 Harley v. Zack, 217 Mich. 549, 187 N.W. 533 (1922). 
5Jbid. 
6 LaFetra v. Beveridge, 124 N.J. Eq. 24, 199 A. 70 (1938). However, the plat alone 
will not prove the existence of a general scheme if the restrictions are not stated on the 
plat. Utujian v. Boldt, 242 Mich. 331, 218 N.W. 692 (1928). 
7 Hays v. St. Paul M.E. Church, 196 ill. 633, 63 N.E. 1040 (1902). 
s Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 4.64, 133 N.W. 317 (1911). As to what factors are 
considered and what weight should be given to them, see the annotation in 45 L.R.A (n.s.) 
962 at 966 (1913). 
9 Doctrine stated in Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925), 
annotated in 60 A.L.R. 1216 (1929). 
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covenants in the deeds to the subdivision with the intent in each case that the 
grantee is to benefit from similar restrictions in the deeds of later grantees to 
subdivision property.10 The restrictions are then enforceable by all in the 
subdivision against those who take with notice of them.11 Since in the principal 
case there were no restrictions in the defendant's chain of title, can a restrictive 
agreement be implied from the general scheme? There is considerable confusion 
as to the function of the general scheme. It is used primarily to prove that the 
common grantor intended the benefit of written restrictions to go to later 
grantees in the subdivision. Many courts restrict the use of the general scheme 
to this purpose only, thus making it necessary to have written covenants in the 
deeds in order to enforce the restrictions against subsequent parties taking within 
the subdivision.12 The general scheme has also been used to infer the agreement 
to restrict.13 This would eliminate the necessity of written covenants or of 
showing proven oral agreements to restrict. From the emphasis placed upon 
the general scheme in the principal case, it appears that the court would favor 
this view. Since the requirement of an equitable servitude is that title be taken 
with notice of restrictions, it seems that the court was indicating that an agree-
ment to restrict could be inferred from a general scheme. Finally, the general 
scheme has been used to infer that actual notice of building restrictions has 
been given to all those who buy within the subdivision.14 If courts come to 
allow the general scheme to serve all three of these functions, the end result 
is likely to be that they will hold that mere proof of the existence of a general 
scheme will bind all of the lots in the subdivision as a matter of law, without 
troubling to theorize on why this is so. If in the principal case the court intends 
to place such an extended significance on the existence of a general scheme, 
it is difficult to see what purpose could be gained in the remedy requiring the 
defendant to place these restrictions on his lots before selling them. His succes-
sor in title could be bound by the existence of the general scheme in exactly 
the same fashion that defendant here could be bound. But if the court relies 
on actual notice of the general scheme to the defendant (rather than notice 
10 Excellent discussion of this doctrine is in 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §9.33, 
p. 430 (1952). A consideration of the doctrine in Michigan is found in 6 MrcH. S.B.J. 
222-240, 249-270 (1927). 
11 As to what constitutes notice, the courts have developed several standards. See 3 
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §863, p. 491 (1939). 
12 All authorities cited in' the principal case hold this view. See also annotations in 
21 A.L.R. 1281 at 1306 (1922); 60 A.L.R. 1223 (1929); and 33 A.L.R. 676 (1924). 
For a holding that absolute universality of restrictions in deeds is not required, see Hartt 
v. Rueter, 223 Mass. 207, 111 N.E. 1045 (1916). The California court will not even go 
this far. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919). 
13 Allen v. Detroit, note 8 supra; 45 L.R.A. 962 at 964 (1913); Kiskadden v. Berman, 
224 Mich. 473, 221 N.W. 632 (1928); Sanborn v. McLean, note 9 supra. 
14 Nerrerter v. Little, 258 Mich. 462, 243 N.W. 25 (1932). See also 10 Mnm. L. 
REv. 619 (1926), and cases therein cited. Contra: Bradley v. Walker, 138 N.Y. 291, 33 
N.E. 1079 (1893); Casterton v. Plotkin, 188 Mich. 333, 154 N.W. 151 (1915). In the 
latter case, the court distinguished Allen v. Detroit, note 8 supra. 
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implied purely from the existence of a general scheme), then there would be 
purpose to such a decree. In that event the subsequent owner might not have 
the same actual notice that the defendant does here. 
Herbert R. Brown 
